RedHotel: A Prolific, Chinese State-Sponsored Group Operating at a Global Scale | Recorded Future

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New Insikt Group research examines RedHotel, a Chinese state-sponsored threat activity group that stands out due to its persistence, operational intensity, and global reach. RedHotel’s operations span 17 countries in Asia, Europe, and North America from 2021 to 2023. Its targets encompass academia, aerospace, government, media, telecommunications, and research sectors. Particularly focused on Southeast Asia’s governments and private companies in specified sectors, RedHotel’s infrastructure for malware command-and-control, reconnaissance, and exploitation points to administration in Chengdu, China. Its methods align with other contractor groups linked to China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), indicating a nexus of cyber talent and operations in Chengdu.

2023-redhotel-body.png
Schematic of RedHotel’s multi-tiered C2 infrastructure network

RedHotel has a dual mission of intelligence gathering and economic espionage. It targets both government entities for traditional intelligence and organizations involved in COVID-19 research and technology R&D. Notably, it compromised a US state legislature in 2022, highlighting its expanded reach. RedHotel employs a multi-tiered infrastructure with a distinct focus on reconnaissance and long-term network access via command-and-control servers.

Since at least 2019, RedHotel has exemplified a relentless scope and scale of wider PRC state-sponsored cyber-espionage activity by maintaining a high operational tempo and targeting public and private sector organizations globally. The group often utilizes a mix of offensive security tools, shared capabilities, and bespoke tooling.

Recorded Future’s Insikt Group observes various Chinese state-sponsored cyber threats, with RedHotel standing out for its broad scope and intensity of activity. RedHotel’s campaigns include innovations such as exploiting a stolen code signing certificate and commandeering Vietnamese government infrastructure. Despite public exposure, RedHotel’s bold approach suggests it will persist in its activities.

To read the entire analysis with endnotes, click here to download the report as a PDF.

Appendix A — Indicators of Compromise

Domains:
dga[.]asia
kb.dga[.]asia
video.dga[.]asia
sc.dga[.]asia
dgti.dga[.]asia
nhqdc[.]com
msdn.microsoft.nhqdc[.]com
icoreemail[.]com
demo.icoreemail[.]com
officesuport[.]com
kiwi.officesuport[.]com
cdn.officesuport[.]com
test.officesuport[.]com
mail.officesuport[.]com
ntpc.officesuport[.]com
main.officesuport[.]com
excel.officesuport[.]com
remote.officesuport[.]com
ismtrsn[.]club
lrm.ismtrsn[.]club
tgoomh.ismtrsn[.]club
news.ismtrsn[.]club
icarln.ismtrsn[.]club
liveonlin[.]com
npgsql.liveonlin[.]com
public.liveonlin[.]com
tech.liveonlin[.]com
main.liveonlin[.]com
cctv.liveonlin[.]com
alexa-api[.]com
www.alexa-api[.]com
ngndc[.]com
air.ngndc[.]com
spa.ngndc[.]com
mkn.ngndc[.]com
ekaldhfl[.]club
ts.ekaldhfl[.]club
ist.ekaldhfl[.]club
downloads.ekaldhfl[.]club
pps.ekaldhfl[.]club
plt.ekaldhfl[.]club
tlt.ekaldhfl[.]club
thy.ekaldhfl[.]club
us.ekaldhfl[.]club
asia-cdn[.]asia
report.asia-cdn[.]asia
freehighways[.]com
map.freehighways[.]com
iredemail[.]com
index.iredemail[.]com
demo.iredemail[.]com
open.iredemail[.]com
api.iredemail[.]com
full.iredemail[.]com
bbs.iredemail[.]com
0nenote[.]com
keep.0nenote[.]com
asia-cdn[.]asia
api.asia-cdn[.]asia
speedtest.asia-cdn[.]asia
cyberoams[.]com
checkip.cyberoams[.]com
ekaldhfl[.]club
pps.ekaldhfl[.]club
usa.ekaldhfl[.]club
mtlklabs[.]co
conhostsadas[.]website
itcom666[.]live
qbxlwr4nkq[.]itcom666[.]live
8kmobvy5o[.]itcom666[.]live
itcom888[.]live
bwlgrafana[.]itcom888[.]live
itsm-uat-app[.]itcom888[.]live
dkxvb0mf[.]itcom888[.]live
nvw3tdetwx[.]itcom888[.]live
0j10u9wi[.]itcom888[.]live
yt-sslvpn[.]itcom888[.]live
vappvcsa[.]itcom888[.]live
94ceaugp[.]itcom888[.]live
sibersystems[.]xyz
fyalluw0[.]sibersystems[.]xyz
sijqlfnbes.sibersystems[.]xyz
jmz8xhxen3.sibersystems[.]xyz
2h3cvvhgtf.sibersystems[.]xyz
3tgdtyfpt9.sibersystems[.]xyz
n71qtqemam.sibersystems[.]xyz
711zm77cwq.sibersystems[.]xyz
R77wu4s847.sibersystems[.]xyz
caamanitoba[.]us
jw7uvtodx4.caamanitoba[.]us
xdryqrbe.caamanitoba[.]us
b1k10pk9.caamanitoba[.]us
6hi6m62bzp.caamanitoba[.]us
livehost[.]live
sci.livehost[.]live

C2 IP Addresses (seen May to June 2023)
1.13.82[.]101
5.188.33[.]188
5.188.33[.]254
5.188.34[.]164
5.188.34[.]173
38.54.16[.]131
38.54.16[.]179
38.60.199[.]87
38.60.199[.]208
45.76.186[.]26
45.77.153[.]197
61.238.103[.]165
64.227.132[.]226
92.38.169[.]222
92.38.176[.]128
92.38.178[.]40
92.38.178[.]60
92.223.90[.]133
95.85.91[.]50
103.140.239[.]41
103.157.142[.]95
108.61.158[.]179
139.180.193[.]182
140.82.7[.]72
141.164.63[.]244
154.212.129[.]132
156.236.114[.]202

TLS Certificate (SHA256 Fingerprints):
f8cd64625f8964239dad1b2ce7372d7a293196455db7c6b5467f7770fd664a61
294fb8f21034475198c3320d01513cc9917629c6fd090af76ea0ff8911e0caa3
9c8e5f6e5e843767f0969770478e3ad449f8a412dad246a17ea69694233884b9
29ed44228ed4a9883194f7e910b2aac8e433ba3edd89596353995ba9b9107093
b02aed9a615b6dff2d48b1dd5d15d898d537033b2f6a5e9737d27b0e0817b30e

Cobalt Strike Loaders
5cba27d29c89caf0c8a8d28b42a8f977f86c92c803d1e2c7386d60c0d8641285
48e81b1c5cc0005cc58b99cefe1b6087c841e952bb06db5a5a6441e92e40bed6
25da610be6acecfd71bbe3a4e88c09f31ad07bdd252eb30feeef9debd9667c51
233bb85dbeba69231533408501697695a66b7790e751925231d64bddf80bbf91
aeceaa7a806468766923a00e8c4eb48349f10d069464b53674eeb150e0a59123

Brute Ratel Loaders
6e3c3045bb9d0db4817ad0441ee3c95b8fe3e087388d1ceefb9ebbd2608aef16
6f31a4656afb8d9245b5b2f5a634ddfbdb9db3ca565d2c52aee68554ede068d1
c00991cfeafc055447d7553a14be2303e105b6a97ab35ecf820b9dbd42826f9d

Winnti
5861584bb7fa46373c1b1f83b1e066a3d82e9c10ce87539ee1633ef0f567e743
69ff2f88c1f9007b80d591e9655cc61eaa4709ccd8b3aa6ec15e3aa46b9098bd
2f1321c6cf0bc3cf955e86692bfc4ba836f5580c8b1469ce35aa250c97f0076e
f1dcf623a8f8f4b26fe54fb17c8597d6cc3f7066789daf47a5f1179bd7f7001a

Spyder
7a61708f391a667c8bb91fcfd7392a328986059563d972960f8237a69e375d50
5d3a6f5bd0a72ee653c6bdad68275df730b836d6f9325ee57ec7d32997d5dcef
1ded9878f8680e1d91354cbb5ad8a6960efd6ddca2da157eb4c1ef0f0430fd5f
e053ca5888fb0d5099efed76e68a1af0020aaaa34ca610e7a1ac0ae9ffe36f6e
24d4089f74672bc00c897a74664287fe14d63a9b78a8fe2bdbbf9b870b40d85c

FunnySwitch
7056e9b69cc2fbc79ba7a492906bcc84dabc6ea95383dff3844dfde5278d9c7a
ede0c1f0d6c3d982f63abbdd5f10648948a44e5fa0d948a89244a06abaf2ecfe
9eb0124d822d6b0fab6572b2a4445546e8029ad6bd490725015d49755b5845a4

Appendix B — Mitre ATT&CK Techniques

Tactic: Technique ATT&CK Code Observable
Reconnaissance: Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning T1595.002 RedHotel has used vulnerability scanning tools such as Acunetix to scan externally facing appliances for vulnerabilities
Resource Development: Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001 RedHotel has purchased domains, primarily via Namecheap.
Resource Development: Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server T1583.003 RedHotel has provisioned actor-controlled VPS, with a preference for the providers Choopa (Vultr), G-Core, and Kaopu Cloud HK Limited.
Resource Development: Compromise Infrastructure: Server T1584.004 RedHotel has also used compromised GlassFish servers as Cobalt Strike C2s and to scan target networks.
Initial Access: Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 RedHotel has exploited public-facing applications for initial access, including Zimbra Collaboration Suite (CVE-2022-24682, CVE-2022-27924, CVE-2022-27925 chained with CVE-2022-37042, and CVE-2022-30333), Microsoft Exchange (ProxyShell), and the Log4Shell vulnerability in Apache Log4J.
Initial Access: Spearphishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001 RedHotel has used archive spearphishing attachments containing shortcut (LNK) files which fetch remotely hosted scripts (HTA, VBScript). These scripts are then used to trigger DLL search order hijacking infection chains and display decoy documents to users.
Persistence: Server Software Component: Web Shell T1505.003 RedHotel has used web shells within victim environments and to interact with compromised GlassFish servers
Persistence:: Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005 RedHotel has used scheduled tasks for persistence for the group’s Spyder backdoor:

C:WindowsSystem32schtasks.exe /RUN /TN PrintWorkflow_10e3b

Persistence: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547.001 The ScatterBee ShadowPad loader persists via the Run registry key and also stores the encrypted ShadowPad payload in the registry.
Defense Evasion: Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 RedHotel has used the tool ScatterBee to obfuscate ShadowPad payloads. The group has also repeatedly stored encrypted or encoded payloads within files named bin.config.
Defense Evasion: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1140
Defense Evasion: Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing T1553.002 RedHotel has signed malicious binaries using stolen code signing certificates (such as the referenced WANIN International certificate).
Defense Evasion: Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking T1574.001 RedHotel has abused multiple legitimate executables for DLL search order hijacking, including vfhost.exe, mcods.exe, and BDReinit.exe.
Defense Evasion: Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location T1036.005 RedHotel has used legitimate file names in tandem with DLL search order hijacking to load malicious DLLs.
Command and Control: Proxy: External Proxy T1090.002 RedHotel has used VPS C2s to proxy traffic upstream to actor-controlled servers.
Command and Control: Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 RedHotel Brute Ratel and Cobalt Strike samples referenced within this report communicate over HTTPS.
Exfiltration: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041 RedHotel has exfiltrated data over malware C2 channels.

Source: Original Post


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