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We have discovered some of the most dangerous threats and nation state attacks in our space – including the Kaseya MSP breach and the more_eggs malware.
Our Security Operations Centers are supported with Threat Intelligence, Tactical Threat Response and Advanced Threat Analytics driven by our Threat Response Unit – the TRU team.
In TRU Positives, eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) provides a summary of a recent threat investigation. We outline how we responded to the confirmed threat and what recommendations we have going forward.
Here’s the latest from our TRU Team…
What did we find?
In late September 2023, the eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU) observed and prevented an infection by the NetWire RAT. NetWire was a publicly available remote administration tool with password-stealing and keylogging capabilities that first emerged in the wild in 2012.
In March 2023, the FBI shut down NetWire and arrested Mario Zanko, who resided in Croatia, and was responsible for distributing the RAT. Zanko was also responsible for operating the NetWire website where sales took place (Figure 1).
We assess with high confidence that the primary source of infection was a drive-by download. The user visited a website offering the Microsoft Office 2019 Professional Plus installer, along with an activator program named “Office 2013-2019 C2R Install”.
The downloaded RAR archive, labeled “x64 v16.0.12130.20272_Multi.rar”, contained a binary file named OInstall.exe (MD5: 38be94769e4f59d9a90e551e505c2e07). Unfortunately, we could not identify the exact website or source from which the user obtained the archive.
The initial malicious file contained an AutoIT script that, upon execution and decryption, drops the OInstall.exe (Office 2013-2019 C2R Install) (MD5: b326fc82fb91811c223965d0d63c7a42) and install.exe (MD5: 6037361243f8c390326debbea5b85ac2) file under the %TEMP% folder, which is a .NET binary that we will be analyzing in this article.
Upon decompiling/detokenizing the AutoIt script, we got an encrypted file (Figure 2). The detokenized AutoIt script is decrypted using XOR operations, as illustrated in Figure 3. Notably, the key for each decryption is derived from the last byte of the preceding encrypted string.
The decrypted script also contains two embedded base64-encoded binaries that are mentioned previously in this article – OInstall.exe and install.exe.
Core Payload – install.exe
We will look at the core payload, install.exe. Immediately after loading the binary in dnSpy, we can see the resource file that might contain some encrypted data based on the size (121278 bytes). Next, we will try to look for the function that might be responsible for locating and loading the resource section.
The highlighted function in Figure 4 looks quite interesting. It extracts every 5th character from the obfuscated string (“aL0mTs;1lUmnUrgzBFN7:NS^B/Rpm/qfg^(:Vrj??O<g<E8X@ggHKVujPsXi=VUnd]>7j>90N[D=JH0]7Wl-:`lE9uMU:a@J2Q-l>Q^f04<0AHL^E-V9vZFw3sb]r7NV{d?r@3cwYh2w:[5}efGX)uVTg/2Vik(Pt<<?PJYe<jusjs;vGKiloHKzWpoAefJgL>`S>[P6ih0jMH-[pDi9lVLy]?9u=+=NCY)5tP6(<9:/ReJ5(<XZO?Weia<[6O?fwh<RleE01am@cogvA0Nsf:F6><Gm`[YU`Ra^[wy-U@8nz0`O<AeHAu-ndREZeKuQ0iH2`-uVs?9_XLA]BdJe*9;N6)e9Km)5qkn?2KfC”)
to recreate the original string.
We can recreate the deobfuscation function as shown in Figure 5 and apply our obfuscated string.
As a result, we receive the string “asmz://(?<guid>[0-9a-fA-F]{32})/(?<size>[0-9]+)(/(?<flags>[a-zA-Z0-9]*))?”. This string pattern is a regular expression that describes a specific string format and can extract parts of it. Let’s break down what this pattern is looking for:
- Starts with “asmz://”.
- Followed by a 32-character hexadecimal GUID capture group.
- Followed by a forward slash and a number (size).
- Optionally, followed by another forward slash and alphanumeric flags.
The requirements match with the name of our resource file within the install.exe binary “asmz://87aec78c4c6931fe7cdf575766b54ea2/138240/z”, where “87aec78c4c6931fe7cdf575766b54ea2” is the GUID capture group, “138240” is the size and “z’ is the flags.
The resource file is then decompressed with DeflateStream. This is a stream class provided by .NET to handle the deflate compression algorithm. Upon decompressing the resource file, we get a DLL file (MD5: 797b3318a7323b73df2bdc910f6ce92f). The method “ResourceDecrypt” is responsible for retrieving the resource file within the DLL binary and then decrypting the file AES.
We receive another executable upon the AES decryption (MD5: a60238d3d7d3d6d90bae440cc4ff25ea). We will proceed with renaming the method names to simplify the analysis.
AntiVM
The “antivm” method checks the system’s registry for indications that it’s running within a virtual machine (VM). It accesses the BIOS description in the registry to retrieve the system’s product name and manufacturer, accesses another system-related registry key to obtain the BIOS version, then checks if any of the retrieved values contain “VM”, “VMware”, or “VBOX”.
If the values contain the mentioned strings, the binary terminates the current running process (Figure 7).
Persistence
The method “persistence” is responsible for setting up the persistence mechanism on the infected machine by creating a folder named “apppatch” under %APPDATA%, the binary copies itself into the created folder under “mtstocom.exe” and adds itself to the “Load” registry value to load the malicious binary when the user logs on under the registry path “HKEY_CURRENT_USERSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWindows” as demonstrated in Figure 8.
UAC Bypass
The binary determines the version of the operating system. If the version is 7, it performs the UAC bypass using Eventvwr.exe; if it’s 10, it uses Fodhelper.exe
for the bypass, as shown in Figure 9.
Frenchy Shellcode
Finally, it decrypts one of the resource files using AES and then decompresses it, which leads us to the final payload – NetWire RAT (MD5: 2da7b1cf405f791165e42ce5a3efad97), the second decrypted file is a Frenchy Shellcode (frenchy_shellcode_002 – based on the mutex, MD5: abdb5f121849f3f3718768d37abe0173) that is responsible for process hollowing into RegAsm.exe process.
The shellcode function in Figure 10 extracts a list of functions from the Process Environment Block (PEB). It then dynamically resolves the addresses of the NtOpenSection and NtMapViewOfSection functions using the list and a function labeled as “mw_resolve_fnc”. “mw_resolve_fnc” is an export address table (EAT) lookup function.
Given the base address of a module (DLL) and the name of a function, it will locate and return the address of that function from the module’s export table.
NetWire
NetWire encrypts its configuration with RC4 as shown in Figure 11.
The extracted configuration:
C2 list: “qayshaija.ddns[.]net:1515” Password: "Password", Host ID: "HostId-%Rand%", Mutex: "-", Install Path: "-", Startup Name: "-", ActiveX Key: "-", KeyLog Directory: "%AppData%Logs"
What did we do?
What can you learn from this TRU Positive?
- The initial binary contained an obfuscated AutoIt script. This script subsequently dropped the primary payload responsible for activating the NetWire RAT.
- This core payload leveraged the Frenchy Shellcode technique to execute process hollowing, resulting in the deployment of NetWire RAT within RegAsm.exe.
- Apart from the core functionalities, the payload comes equipped with features for AntiVM detection, UAC (User Account Control) bypass, and ensuring persistence within the compromised system.
- For stealth, NetWire employs RC4 encryption to secure its configuration data.
Recommendations from our Threat Response Unit (TRU) Team:
- Train users to identify and report potentially malicious content using Phishing and Security Awareness Training (PSAT) programs.
- Ensure employees have access to a dedicated software center to download corporate-approved software.
- Protect endpoints against malware by:
Indicators of Compromise
| Name | Indicators |
| OInstall.exe | 38be94769e4f59d9a90e551e505c2e07 |
| install.exe | 6037361243f8c390326debbea5b85ac2 |
| DLL binary (second payload) | 797b3318a7323b73df2bdc910f6ce92f |
| Executable binary (third payload) | a60238d3d7d3d6d90bae440cc4ff25ea |
| NetWire RAT | 2da7b1cf405f791165e42ce5a3efad97 |
| Frenchy Shellcode | abdb5f121849f3f3718768d37abe0173 |
| NetWire C2 | qayshaija.ddns[.]net:1515 |
Source: https://www.esentire.com/blog/netwire-rat-the-stealthy-invasion-via-frenchy-shellcode