Cyble – Deep Dive Analysis – Pandora Ransomware

Pandora ransomware came into the spotlight in March 2022 after targeting some high-profile victims on its leak site. The ransomware group announced its first victim on 21 Feb 2022 and has posted around five victims to date.

Figure 1 Pandora ransomware data leak site
Figure 1: Pandora ransomware data leak site

During a routine threat hunting exercise, Cyble Research Labs came across the sample for this ransomware. Upon execution, the file encrypts the victim’s system and drops the ransom note in each folder named “Restore_My_Files.txt.” After encryption, the file is renamed with the extension “.Pandora“.

Figure 2 Encrypted Files
Figure 2: Encrypted Files

Technical Analysis

The malware (SHA 256: 5b56c5d86347e164c6e571c86dbf5b1535eae6b979fede6ed66b01e79ea33b7b) is packed using the UPX packer. After unpacking, the payload is compiled using Visual C++. The file has encrypted strings and several jumps and calls that can make debugging difficult, as shown below.

Figure 3 Code flow of Pandora Ransomware
Figure 3: Code flow of Pandora Ransomware

The malware runs a decryption loop that decrypts the strings present in the file, as shown in Figure 4. 

Figure 4 Decryption Loop
Figure 4: Decryption Loop

Initially, the malware creates a mutex named “ThisIsMutexa” using CreateMutexA() API to ensure that only one instance of the malware is running in the system.

Figure 5 Creates
Figure 5: Creates Mutex

The malware then loads ntdll.dll and calls the NtSetInformationProcess () API, which changes the privilege level and sets the malware file as a critical process. The malware then disables the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) by patching the EtwEventWrite() function and further bypasses Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) to evade detection by Anti-Virus products.

The AMSI allows the integration of applications and processes with the anti-malware solution present on a system. AMSI scans files that are executed through PowerShell, Jscript, VBA, VBScript, etc.

The malware also calls SetProcessShutdownParameters() to reduce the process’s priority, i.e., set it to zero. This means that malware will be terminated last before the system shutdown so that the malware gets the maximum amount of time possible to execute in the compromised machine.

After altering the priority,  the malware calls SHEmptyRecycleBinA() API to empty the recycle bin to ensure no deleted files are restored after encryption.

Like other ransomware, the malware deletes shadow copies using vssadmin using ShellExecuteW() API, as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6 Deletes shadow copies
Figure 6: Deletes shadow copies

Before encrypting the machine, the malware gets the Volume details by calling the APIs such as:

  • GetDriveTypeW()
  • FindFirstVolumeW()
  • FindNextVolumeW()
  • GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeNameW()
  • GetLogicalDrives()

Before initiating encryption, the ransomware checks and excludes specific folders from encryption – such as AppData, Boot, Windows, Windows.old, Tor Browser, Internet Explorer, Google, Opera, Opera Software, Mozilla, Mozilla Firefox, ProgramData, Program Files, Program Files (x86).

The Ransomware also excludes certain files from encryption such as autorun.inf, boot.ini, bootfont.bin, bootsect.bak, bootmgr, bootmgr.efi, bootmgfw.efi, desktop.ini, iconcache.db, ntldr, ntuser.dat.

Additionally, specific extensions are also exempted from encryption – such as .pandora, .hta, .exe, .dll, .cpl, .ini, .cab, .cur, .drv, .hlp, .icl, .icns, .ico, .idx, .sys, .spl, .ocx.

Finally, the ransomware searches for files using FindFirstFileW() and FindNextFileW () APIs and then proceeds to encrypt them.

The malware uses multithreading approach for faster encryption. It calls CreateThread(), SetThreadAffinityMask(), ResumeThread(), CreteIOCompletionPort() and GetQueuedCompletionStatus() APIs for multithreading.

Finally, the ransom note is displayed, as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7 Ransom note
Figure 7: Ransom note

Possible ROOK ransomware re-brand:

During our analysis, we found that the Tactic Technique and Procedures (TTPs) of the Pandora and ROOK ransomware shared a lot of similarities.

In Dec 2021, ROOK ransomware posted on their leak site claiming to have attacked one of the world’s largest automotive suppliers of technology and components. Following this, their leak site went down around the end of Jan 2022.

Pandora ransomware in March 2022 posted the same victim on their leak site. Due to this incident and the similarities in how they operate,  it is suspected that Pandora might be a re-brand of ROOK ransomware.

Figure 8 Pandora ransomware leak site
Figure 8: Pandora ransomware leak site

Conclusion 

There’s a good chance that Pandora ransomware is a re-brand of ROOK ransomware. We had observed similar behavior in the past when ransomware groups were coming up with new aliases when they were under scrutiny.

Pandora ransomware gang is suspected of leveraging the double extortion method where the TAs exfiltrate the victim’s data followed by data encryption. Then, they threaten to leak the exfiltrated data on their leak site or on cybercrime forums.

Organizations can mitigate such attacks by monitoring the darkweb and acting upon early warning indicators such as compromised credentials, data breaches, and identifying vulnerabilities traded on cybercrime forums.

Our Recommendations: 

  • Enforce password change policies for the network and critical business applications or consider implementing multi-factor authentication for all remote network access points.
  • Reduce the attack surface by ensuring that sensitive ports are not exposed on the Internet.
  • Conduct cybersecurity awareness programs for employees and contractors.
  • Implement a risk-based vulnerability management process for IT infrastructure to ensure that critical vulnerabilities and security misconfigurations are identified and prioritized for remediation.
  • Instruct users to refrain from opening untrusted links and email attachments without verifying their authenticity.
  • Deploy reputed anti-virus and internet security software package on your company-managed devices, including PCs, laptops, and mobile devices.
  • Turn on the automatic software update features on computers, mobiles, and other connected devices wherever possible and pragmatic.
  • Define and implement a backup process and secure those backup copies by keeping them offline or on a separate network 

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques  

Tactic Technique ID Technique Name
Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Privilege Escalation T1548
T1134
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Defense Evasion T1112
T1027
T1562.001
Modify Registry
Obfuscated Files or Information
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Discovery T1082
T1083
System Information Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Impact T1490
T1489
T1486
Inhibit System Recovery 
Service Stop
Data Encrypted for Impact

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):   

Indicators  Indicator type  Description 
0c4a84b66832a08dccc42b478d9d5e1b 160320b920a5ef22ac17b48146152ffbef60461f 5b56c5d86347e164c6e571c86dbf5b1535eae6b979fede6ed66b01e79ea33b7b Md5   SHA-1  SHA-256  Executable binary

About Us  

Cyble is a global threat intelligence SaaS provider that helps enterprises protect themselves from cybercrimes and exposure in the Darkweb. Its prime focus is to provide organizations with real-time visibility to their digital risk footprint. Backed by Y Combinator as part of the 2021 winter cohort, Cyble has also been recognized by Forbes as one of the top 20 Best Cybersecurity Start-ups To Watch In 2020. Headquartered in Alpharetta, Georgia, and with offices in Australia, Singapore, and India, Cyble has a global presence. To learn more about Cyble, visit www.cyble.com.   

Source: https://blog.cyble.com/2022/03/15/deep-dive-analysis-pandora-ransomware/